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Since 2015, far right parties drawing heavily on radical anti-refugee rhetoric gained
electoral support in Germany while the number of political hate crimes targeting
refugees rose. Both phenomena – far right electoral support and prevalence of right-
wing hate crimes – have theoretically and empirically been linked with socio-structural
and contextual variables. However, systematic empirical research on these links is
scattered and scarce at best. We combine official statistics on political hate crimes
targeting refugees in Germany and far right electoral support of the far right party
“Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) in the German national elections 2017 with socio-
structural variables (proportion of foreigners and unemployment rate) and survey data
collected in a representative survey (N = 1,506) in 2016. We aggregate and combine
data for all German municipalities except Berlin which were the level of analysis for
the current study. In path analyses, we find socio-structural variables to be unrelated
with each other but significantly correlated with both criterion variables in a systematic
fashion: proportion of foreigners was negatively while unemployment rate was positively
linked with far right electoral support. Right-wing crime was linked positively with
unemployment rate across Germany and positively with proportion of foreigners only
in East Germany while proportion of foreigners was unrelated to right-wing crime in
West Germany. When including survey measures into the model, they were linked
with socio-structural variables in the predicted fashion – intergroup contact correlated
positively with proportion of foreigners, collective deprivation correlated positively with
unemployment rates, and both predicted extreme right-wing attitudes. However, their
contribution to the explained variance in outcome variables above and beyond socio-
structural variables was neglectable. We argue that both far right-wing electoral
support and right-wing hate crime can be conceptualized as behavioral forms of
political extremism shaped through socio-structural and contextual factors and discuss
implications for preventing political extremism.
Keywords: right-wing extremism, populist parties, intergroup contact, collective deprivation, socio-structural
variables
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“The one thing [. . .] that is truly ugly is the climate of hate
and intimidation, created by a noisy few, which makes the
decent majority reluctant to air in public their views on anything
controversial.”
– Edward Abbey
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the recent wave of success for far
right, right-wing populist and extreme right-wing parties, figures
and movements globally but especially in the Western world.
There seems to be agreement that we are witnessing what some
scholars have called a “revolt against liberal democracy” (Eatwell
and Goodwin, 2018), a “cultural backlash” (Norris and Inglehart,
2019), or – in more technical and less alarming words – growing
support for the far right (Golder, 2016). These developments
seem to temporally coincide with an increase in hate-crime in
countries across the world (see, e.g., Osce Hate Crime Reporting,
2019) and a number of right-wing terrorist attacks that have
gained media attention around the world: Attacks in Oslo
and Utøya, 2011, Charleston, 2015, and Christchurch, 2019
among others have been directly linked with extreme right-wing
ideology. While there is by now a rich literature on far right
electoral support, its potential links with right-wing crimes are
not well understood. In public discourse and discussions amongst
practitioners, there seems to be an implicit assumption that
both phenomena – far right electoral support and prevalence of
right-wing hate crimes – are related (e.g., Chu, 2018). However,
systematic empirical research on such potential links is scattered
and scarce at best. In the current paper, we argue that both
are not independent phenomena but have similar correlates
and are also correlated with each other. We combine official
statistics on reported right-wing hate crimes targeting refugees
in Germany and far right electoral support in the German
national elections 2017 and investigate links with socio-structural
variables (proportion of foreigners and unemployment rate) on
the one hand and with psychological variables measured in a
representative survey (perceived threat, intergroup contact, and
extreme right-wing attitudes) on the other hand.1 We show that
both phenomena co-occur geographically, and we do so in the
German context where right-wing hate crime has recently peaked
while the far right has seen increasing electoral support in the
aftermath of the immense refugee in-migration since 2015.
The German Context
In recent years, wars and other conflicts including personal
persecution, primarily in the Middle East and Africa have
forced millions of individuals to leave their original places of
residence. While most refugees temporarily settle in neighboring
countries like Lebanon or Turkey, many have also migrated to
Western Europe. Almost 1 million refugees have sought asylum
in Germany in the year 2015 alone (German Federal Office
for Migration and Refugees, 2019). Germany was not only the
1We refer to the far right party family following Golder (2016) where a more
elaborate discussion and distinction between radicalism, populism, extremism,
and nationalism within the far right can be found.
European country in which most refugees applied for asylum
(Eurostat, 2017). It has also been at the center of attention for
a number of events during this period, most prominently for its
“welcome culture”. As one example, German chancellor Angela
Merkel famously announced that several thousand refugees
would be allowed to cross the border from Hungary to Austria
and into Germany in September 2015 (e.g., Hall and Lichfield,
2015). Her public press announcement “Wir schaffen das!”
(We can do this) became historical. While solidarity and the
willingness to help have generally been high (e.g., Akrap, 2015),
Germany also experienced a wave of hostile and violent resistance
against refugees (e.g., Bencˇek and Strasheim, 2016). The number
of political hate crimes targeting refugees and their homes in
Germany rose dramatically and peaked in 2016 with a total of
more than 3,000 incidents according to official sources with an
unclear number of incidents that remained in the dark field
(Federal Government, 2017; ProAsyl, 2017).2 Such incidents
range from propaganda crimes like libel, incitement of the masses
and harassment to violent hate crimes like assault, arson and
right-wing extremist terrorist attacks.
During the same period, far right parties drawing on
radical anti-refugee rhetoric gained electoral support in
Germany – most notably the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland,
Alternative for Germany).
We begin by tracing the rise of this most prominent
current far right party in Germany, the AfD, and summarize
previous research and historical links between socio-structural
variables such as unemployment and far right electoral support.
We then briefly review two prominent social-psychological
factors – perceived threat and intergroup contact – that can help
understand both outcomes that are of interest for the current
work. As we shall see, theoretically as well as empirically, far right
electoral support and right-wing hate crimes have similar socio-
structural as well as psychological correlates that can produce a
dangerous climate of hate.
Rise of the AfD
The AfD was founded in 2013. During the first few years after
its formation, the party strongly opposed European integration,
the European currency “Euro” and especially European assistance
programs during the European sovereign-debt crisis (Arzheimer,
2015), such as the European Stability Mechanism and the
European Financial Stability Facility. The party’s “Euro-skeptic”
positions broadened during the so called “European migration
crisis” from 2015 and onward. Since then, a shift in AfD policy
has been reliably documented: The party’s positions drastically
changed from an economic critique of the European Union
toward a far right ideological, nationalist and anti-immigration
course (e.g., Franz et al., 2018). During this period of change, AfD
personnel and party leadership also changed. This shift seems
to have facilitated electoral success for the AfD. Since 2015, the
2Officially, there is no hate crime legislation in the German Criminal Code.
However, the legal equivalent is called, politisch motivierte Kriminalität rechts“
(PMK-r), which is officially defined as crime “against a person based on political
attitude, nationality, ethnicity, race, skin color, religion, world view, origin, or
physical appearance, disability, sexual orientation or societal status (so called “hate
crimes”)“ (German Ministry of the Interior Building and Community, 2019).
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AfD gained more and more electoral support and was able to
consolidate as a relevant political force with a breakthrough in
2016: In the Eastern German states of Saxony-Anhalt (24.2%) and
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (20.8%), the AfD had their biggest
electoral successes. However, the AfD also had substantial impact
in the in 2016 Western German state elections in Rhineland-
Palatinate (12.6%), Berlin (14.2%) and Baden-Wurttemberg
(15.1%). This trend culminated in a striking 12.6% in the German
general elections in September of 2017 (21.8% in the five states
of the former German Democratic Republic) establishing the
AfD as the third most powerful party and opposition leader in
the German Parliament, the Bundestag. With the AfD in the
Bundestag, the party’s positions and views have entrenched large
parts of German society seemingly independent of financial and
societal status (Zick et al., 2016; Bergmann et al., 2017; Franz
et al., 2018; Schröder, 2018) and support of AfD positions in the
German society increased. Various polls currently have the AfD
(13–14%) close to the Social Democrats (12%), making the AfD
the third most successful party in Germany as of August 2019
(Wahlrecht.de, 2019). Before discussing psychological factors
that should be relevant for the AfD’s electoral success as well
as right-wing hate crime, we shall now review socio-structural
variables that have historically and empirically been linked with
far right electoral support.
Unemployment and Far Right Electoral
Support
The link between unemployment and far right electoral support
is well-established in the literature and has been empirically
demonstrated numerous times. In one of the earliest studies,
Pratt (1948) analyzed the 1932 German Reichstag Elections and
found that unemployed citizens tended to vote for extreme
political parties, such as the Nazi-Party (NSDAP), but also
the Communist-Party (KPD). Falter and Zintl (1988) further
corroborated these findings arguing that high unemployment
rates facilitated the electoral and overall success of the Nazis
in Germany in the 1930s. O’Loughlin et al. (1994), however,
showed that these findings seem to hold only for the 1932 and
1933 German general elections but not for the 1930 election.
The authors stress the importance of “regional and local contexts
of the voting decisions” (O’Loughlin et al., 1994, p. 373). In
more recent studies, the general assertion that unemployment
and far right electoral support are correlated still holds true
(e.g., Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). In his work
on far right electoral support, Rydgren (2009) investigated the
broader concept of social isolation. Among other factors such
as lack of social relations, weak family structures and less
personal involvement in civil society, he lists unemployment as
a key variable for supporting far right parties (Rydgren, 2009).
On the basis of a geographically weighted regression (GWR)
analysis focusing on the electoral results of the German Neo-
Nazi party NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland),
Teney (2012) found a connection between far right electoral
outcomes and local unemployment rates while also emphasizing
the importance of socio-spatial as well as regional variations
among municipalities (Teney, 2012). However, there have been
some studies showing that high levels of unemployment do
not necessarily have a determining impact on far right voting.
Based on election studies, far right voting outcome in seven
European countries as well as supranational surveys, for example,
Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found that higher unemployment
rates are linked with less far right voting. Similarly, Oesch
(2008) emphasizes that unemployment is no major factor
influencing far right voting, but rather matters of identity
claiming that “questions of identity are more important than
economic questions” (Oesch, 2008, p. 370). It seems then that
while unemployment has been linked with far right electoral
support numerous times, it does not tell the full story. In social-
psychological theorizing there are two prominent constructs that
should be of interest for the current research, that is, intergroup
contact and perceived threat.
Intergroup Contact
According to intergroup contact theory, which was first
developed by Allport (1954), opportunities for random
encounters or cross-group friendships (e.g., Pettigrew, 1998)
reduce negative attitudes and prejudice toward outgroups.
Allport originally assumed that certain “optimal conditions” (i.e.,
equal status, perception of common goals, institutional support,
perception of common humanity) would facilitate the positive
effects of intergroup contact (Allport, 1954). In a meta-analysis
of more than 500 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found
empirical support for the theory and showed that optimal contact
conditions may yield greater reduction in negative attitudes but
might not always be necessary to reduce prejudice. Several
adaptations and extensions for Allport’s original theory have
been suggested (e.g., Wright et al., 1997; Pettigrew, 2009) but
there seems to be general agreement that intergroup contact
opportunities tend to decrease hostile and negative attitudes
toward outgroups in general even in the absence of optimal
conditions (but see Barlow et al., 2012).
The proportion of foreigners in a given spatial unit (e.g.,
municipality) can be considered the most straightforward
socio-structural indicator for contact opportunities and varies
considerably across Germany (e.g., Wagner et al., 2003, 2006,
2008). For example, the rate of foreigners is still as much as
four times lower in Eastern versus Western German federal states
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018). Such preconditions provide only
relatively few opportunities for intergroup contact for Germans
in East as compared to West Germany. Contact theory has
consequently been widely used as social-psychological theoretical
framework explaining higher levels of prejudice (e.g., Decker
et al., 2016; Zick et al., 2019) as well as higher rates of xenophobic
attacks and hate crimes against foreigners (e.g., Bencˇek and
Strasheim, 2016) in East versus West Germany (see also Wagner
et al., 2003; Andresen et al., 2018). Furthermore, intergroup
contact with specifically refugees is more prevalent in West
than in East Germany as revealed in recent large-scale surveys
(Ahrens, 2017). Based on intergroup contact theory, one would
therefore predict negative links between proportion of foreigners
and prejudice as well as far right electoral support (Teney,
2012) and political hate-crime (Bencˇek and Strasheim, 2016).
It seems noteworthy that at least this second prediction is
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somewhat contradictory to the intuition that for hate-crimes
to occur, the target outgroup needs to be present. However,
according to intergroup contact theory, hate-crimes should be
most frequent in areas with low rates of outgroup individuals,
that is, for example, foreigners and refugees. In a nutshell, we
thus assumed a negative relationship between number of refugees
in a particular German municipality and numbers of hate-crimes
against refugees. Other theoretical approach that is relevant for
the present study concern perceived threat ostensibly posed by
the outgroup and their members and collective deprivation.
Perceived Threat and Collective
Deprivation
A major psychological driver of antagonistic intergroup attitudes
is the perception that the outgroup threatens the ingroup’s status
or culture (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2004; but see Wagner et al.,
2006). Perceived threat has consequently also been used to
explain differences in prejudice levels between East and West
Germans (Wagner et al., 2003; Asbrock et al., 2014; also see
Semyonov et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2008).
Interestingly, threat can be closely related to the socio-
structural factor discussed above: Higher unemployment rates in
Eastern versus Western German federal states may contribute
to differences in perceived threat or status. In other words,
competition over jobs and economic opportunities might
translate into higher perceived threat by outgroups in general.
This perception may, in turn, be linked with prejudice and
other negative attitudes toward members of ethnic out-groups.
Perceived threat does not necessarily coincide with realistic
threat. In response to the recent so-called “refugee crisis”,
concerns about immigration increased twice as much in East
as compared to West Germany (Sola, 2018; also see Jacobsen
et al., 2017). A concept that might therefore be psychologically
more relevant in this context is collective or fraternal deprivation
(Runciman, 1966; also see Major, 1994; Pettigrew and Meertens,
1995). In his original conceptualization, Runciman (1966)
distinguished fraternal from egoistic deprivation and argued that
it is linked with “lateral solidarity” or ingroup identification
for social groups that are relatively deprived in some objective
way – such as areas with higher unemployment. Even more
importantly, collective deprivation also “uniquely generates
agitation for or against structural change” (Taylor, 2002, p. 15).
It should therefore be particularly relevant when it comes to
voting for a party that insistently opposes structural and societal
change – such as the AfD.
The Current Study
The aim of the current study was to investigate socio-structural
and psychological correlates of far right electoral support and
hate crimes in Germany. Due to its administrative organization
into 401 municipalities (294 “Landkreise/Kreise” and 107
“kreisfreie Städte”), Germany lends itself to analyses combining
data from different sources that are available on this level. We
therefore combine socio-structural data that are made available
on a regular basis (i.e., unemployment rates and proportion of
foreigners per municipality) with other data from official sources
(i.e., election results and reported hate crimes targeting refugees
and their homes). We also included survey data on intergroup
contact, fraternal deprivation, and extreme right-wing attitudes
that were collected as part of a representative telephone survey
and that could be located on the municipality level.
As a first set of hypotheses, we predicted substantial links
between socio-structural factors and both outcome variables.
More specifically, based on previous research and theorizing, we
expected (Hypothesis 1a) unemployment rate to be positively
linked with far right electoral support (e.g., Pratt, 1948; Falter
and Zintl, 1988; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Rydgren, 2009) and
(Hypothesis 1b) proportion of foreigners to be negatively linked
with right-wing hate crime (e.g., Wagner et al., 2003; Bustikova,
2014; Bencˇek and Strasheim, 2016; Andresen et al., 2018). As the
evidence for a link between proportion of foreigners and far right
electoral support is mixed (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Lubbers
et al., 2006; Golder, 2016), we made no predictions regarding
this link or the link between unemployment rate and right-wing
crime. However, we hypothesized that they should be in the same
direction, that is, unemployment rate may be positively linked
with right-wing crime and proportion of foreigners negatively
with AfD electoral success (Hypothesis 1c).
In a second set of hypotheses, we predicted specific links
of socio-structural factors with survey data. As such “cross-
level” links are not commonly theorized or researched, we
based our hypotheses on a general reading of the literature on
intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and
Tropp, 2006) and deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Major,
1994; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995) and predicted psychological
perceptions to be linked with the corresponding socio-structural
parameters in the suitable fashion. More specifically, we expected
proportion of foreigners to be linked with intergroup contact
(Hypothesis 2a) and unemployment rate with perceptions of
fraternal deprivation (Hypothesis 2b). Both should in turn be
correlated with extreme right-wing attitudes (Hypothesis 2c) that
should be predictive of both outcome variables (Hypothesis 2d).
We made no predictions regarding intercorrelations of socio-
structural predictors or outcomes. However, regarding far right
electoral support and right-wing crime, we hypothesized that they
might be correlated because they are facilitated by similar socio-
structural as well as psychological factors.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In a first step, we combined data from three independent and
official sources: socio-structural data for the year 2016 provided
by the German office for statistics, 2017 election results available
through the Federal Election Commissioner, and 6,354 reports
of crimes targeting refugees and their homes filed as “politically
motivated crime, right-wing” by the police between 2015 and
2017 that were collected in an overview (Federal Government,
2016, 2017, 2018). In a second step, we added survey data from a
representative sample drawn in 2016 into the data set.3 We shall
now briefly describe each of our data sources in turn and how
3Some data sources differentiated between East or West Berlin while others did not.
We therefore decided, following previous research (e.g., Wagner et al., 2003) not
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they were combined before analyzing their interrelations more
systematically.
Socio-Structural Data
Official numbers of residents per municipality were available
through the German office for statistics along with other
information on absolute numbers regarding legal status
(unemployed persons and foreigners). We used these numbers to
generate unemployment rates for June 2016 (ranging from 1.2 –
14.7%) and foreigners per municipality for 2016 (ranging from
1.96 – 33.91%).
Election Results
Results for the 2017 national elections are available from the
Federal Election Commissioner along with total valid votes per
municipality. We computed electoral success for the AfD as one
dependent variable by dividing valid AfD votes by total valid
votes per municipality (ranging from 4.94 – 35.46%).
Right-Wing Hate Crimes
Our second dependent variable was the number of right-wing
attacks and crime targeting refugees and their homes reported to
police within municipalities in 2017. We compiled an overview
of 2.211 such incidents based on police statistics. The numbers of
attacks targeting refugees and their homes are published by the
federal Government in so called Antworten der Bundesregierung
(official replies by the Federal Government to requests by
parliamentarians and parties). These are special reports filed
by the Government answering inquiries officially requested by
parliamentary parties or MPs covering various political issues.
The statistics on hate crimes targeting refugees and their homes
were published quarterly and in a final version by the government
in response to members of parliamentary party Die Linke
(The Left). Crimes reported ranged in severity from right-
wing graffiti and dissemination of propaganda to defamation
and harassment all the way to assault, bomb attacks, and
homicide. The crimes had been categorized by the Government
as “politically motivated crime, right-wing” linking them directly
to the “refugee subject matter” (Federal Government, 2018).
Records included running number, date, location, federal state as
well as the most severe reported offense. One sample line reads
“268, 19.10.2017, Erftstadt, NW (Federal state of North Rhine-
Westphalia), Schwere Brandstiftung §306a StGB (severe case of
arson)” (Federal Government, 2018, p. 18).
Two independent coders placed each reported crime within
the respective municipality based on where it had been recorded.
The index of right-wing crimes reported in 2017 ranged from
0 (e.g., in Bottrop) up to 58 in Chemnitz. As municipalities
vary considerably in their numbers of residents and in order
to yield similar ranges for this index as for the other indices,
we used number of right-wing crimes targeting refugees and
their homes reported per 10,000 inhabitants for the analyses to
be reported below.
to include Berlin in our analyses. We note, however, that the pattern of results did
not change substantially when analyses were re-run including Berlin as a whole.
Survey Data
A representative sample of 2,008 German participants was
surveyed in standardized telephone interviews that were
conducted by a professional survey institute between June and
August 2016. The survey covered measures for cross-group
friendships, perceived economic threat, and attitudes toward
various political issues including extreme right-wing attitudes
that we will focus on in this paper and describe below in more
detail (see Zick et al., 2016). To ascertain representativeness of the
sample, telephone numbers were randomly generated, and the
last-birthday method was used to randomly select participants
within households. As 25% of the participants were contacted
via mobile phone numbers and we needed to assign data to
municipality- (Kreis-) level by city-prefix, we only used data from
those N = 1,506 participants that were contacted by landline.
Both sub-samples differed somewhat in terms of age
and gender, with more younger (M = 46.10, SD = 16.93),
t(1896) = 8.75, p < 0.001, and more male participants (55%), χ2
(N = 1917, df = 1) = 18.68, p < 0.001, in the mobile-only sub-
sample than in the landline-only sub-sample. Crucially, however,
both samples did not differ in terms of level of education and
those measures that were of interest for our analyses.
The resulting landline-only sample was M = 53.98 years old
(SD = 16.93), with slightly more female than male participants
(54.4%). Level of education was slightly skewed with 53.6% of the
sample holding a university or technical degree, 28% reporting
some secondary school-leaving certificate, and 12.8% reporting
no degree at all. Monthly household net income was 20.2% “less
than 2,000 EUR”, 19.9% “more than 2,000 but less than 3,000
EUR”, 13.6% “more than 3,000 but less than 4,000 EUR”, and
19.8% “4,000 EUR and more”.
Perceived Collective Deprivation
Perceived collective deprivation was measured with the item “How
would you judge the economic situation of Germans compared
with foreigners living here?” and answers ranging from 1 “very
good” to 5 “very bad”.
Intergroup Contact
Intergroup contact was measured with the item “How many
of your friends or close acquaintances have a migration
background?” with answers ranging from 1 “none” to
4 “very many”.
Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes
Extreme right-wing attitudes were measured using seven items on
a scale ranging from 1 “completely false” to 5 “completely true”.
Items included statements such as “I can understand that some
citizens resist forcefully against homes for asylum seekers” and
“No one can expect for me to live next to a home for asylum
seekers” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83; see section “Supplementary
Material” for the full scale).
As the analyses reported in the current study were based on
secondary analyses of official sources and on data previously
collected in a survey, ethics approval was not required as per
applicable institutional and national guidelines and regulations.
For the survey data used in our analyses, informed consent
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of the participants was implied through survey completion.
Participation in the survey was completely voluntary and
anonymous and participants were free to withdraw from the
survey at any time without incurring any penalties.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations
are shown in Table 1 for all socio-structural variables on
municipality level and in Table 2 for all psychological variables
on both individual (lower triangle) and municipality level
(upper triangle).4 As can be seen, for the latter, means,
standard deviations, and correlational patterns did not differ
significantly between individual and municipality level. We used
psychological measures aggregated on municipality level for the
current analyses to link them with socio-structural variables. On
the one hand, it should be kept in mind that measures varied in
range due to their different sources. On the other hand, it seems
noteworthy that most of them were systematically linked despite
their different sources even after correcting for skew or using
non-parametric test procedures (see Footnote 4). Extreme right-
wing attitudes, for example, were significantly and negatively
correlated with proportion of foreigners, r(346) =−0.13, p = 0.02,
but positively with far right electoral support, r(345) = 0.19,
p < 0.001, and with right-wing crimes reported in the respective
municipalities in the subsequent year, r(346) = 0.12, p = 0.03.
While these correlations are small in magnitude, they were all
significant and in the expected direction. Recall that attitudes
were measured in an independent telephone survey. These were
also correlated with our dependent variables as can be seen
from Table 1.
Local unemployment rates in June 2016, for example, while
unrelated to local proportions of foreigners in the same year,
were correlated with both local far right electoral support,
r(397) = 0.25, p < 0.001, and right-wing crimes reported in the
respective municipalities 1 year later, r(398) = 0.40, p < 0.001.
As one final correlational result, both dependent variables, far
right electoral support and right-wing crimes reported were
linked substantially and positively, r(399) = 0.50, p < 0.001.
Spatial distributions of socio-structural and outcome variables
are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 not only illustrates socio-structural variations across
municipalities – unemployment rates tend to be highest in the
East and the Ruhr area and lowest in the South of Germany,
proportions of foreigners per municipality fall within the lowest
category in almost all Eastern German municipalities. There
is also a striking East-West difference regarding both outcome
variables: far right electoral support was highest in the Eastern
and Southern municipalities and the proportion of right-wing
crime seems to be higher in these areas, too. These differences
also show empirically with significantly higher unemployment
4To correct for positive skew in the data, analyses were re-run using non-
parametric tests or bootstrapping analyses where appropriate. As they yielded the
same pattern of results that is described here and in the following sections, we
report results based on the original data and parametric tests.
TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for
socio-structural data on municipality level.
M (SD) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Unemployment rate 0.06 (0.03) 0.03 0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(2) Proportion of
foreigners
0.10 (0.05) −0.41∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(3) AfD electoral
support
0.13 (0.05) 0.50∗∗∗
(4) Right-wing crimes 0.29 (0.37)
(1) through (3) are per 100, and (4) per 10,000 inhabitants. ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for data on
individual and municipality level.
M (SD)
Individual Municipality (1) (2) (3)
(1) Collective
Deprivation
2.35 (0.90) 2.35 (0.66) −0.12∗ 0.42∗∗
(2) Contact 2.17 (0.84) 2.07 (0.59) −0.06∗∗ −0.25∗∗
(3) Extreme
Right-wing Attitudes
2.34 (0.95) 2.39 (0.66) 0.30∗∗ −0.23∗∗
Individual level correlations in lower and municipality level correlations in upper
triangle. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
rates (MEast = 0.08, SD = 0.02 vs. MWest = 0.05, SD = 0.02),
lower proportions of foreigners (MEast = 0.04, SD = 0.02 vs.
MWest = 0.11, SD = 0.05), higher far right electoral support
(MEast = 0.22, SD = 0.05 vs. MWest = 0.11, SD = 0.03), and
more right-wing crime reported per municipality on average
(MEast = 0.75, SD = 0.55 vs. MWest = 0.18, SD = 0.20),
t(399) = 9.26, t(322) = 20.56, t(87) = 18.94, and t(79) = 8.80,
respectively, all ps < 0.001.5 As East-West differences regarding
attitudes and behavior toward minority groups in Germany have
been demonstrated before (Wagner et al., 2003; Bencˇek and
Strasheim, 2016; cf. Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2016), and
may distort the results of the following analyses, we decided to
account for East-West differences where appropriate and feasible.
Testing the Proposed Model
The correlational analyses reported above lend some initial
support to our proposed model. However, they leave open the
issue of shared variance in predicting the outcome variables as
well as the question of how much predictive value – if any at
all – is added above and beyond harder socio-structural variables
through softer variables such as extreme right-wing attitudes
measured in a telephone survey. In a first set of analyses, we
consequently addressed the issue of shared variance. Crucially, in
assuming random error, conventional statistical models do not
account for shared variance due to geographical proximity or
spatial auto-correlation. We addressed this issue in a second set of
analyses using GWR analyses. In a third and final set of analyses,
5The pattern of results remained the same when applying non-parametric Mann–
Whitney tests (see section “Supplementary Material” for a summary of these
results).
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FIGURE 1 | Natural breaks maps of Germany illustrating spatial distributions of socio-structural and outcome variables: (A) unemployment rate, (B) proportion of
foreigners, (C) far right electoral support, (D) and right-wing crime. Berlin was excluded from the analyses.
we accounted for and explored the differences between East and
West Germany reported above.
Controlling for Potential Overlap on Predictor and
Criterion Sides
First, we performed path analyses to account for potential
overlap both on predictor and criterion sides and to test how
much predictive value our psychological survey measures would
add. Path analyses were performed using AMOS 24.0 and
maximum likelihood estimation. The model was composed in
such a way that the socio-structural variables, unemployment rate
and proportion of foreigners correlated with far right electoral
support and right-wing crime (Figure 2). All four paths remained
significant and almost unchanged when compared to the zero-
order correlations: Proportion of foreigners per municipality on
the one hand were negatively linked with both right-wing crimes
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FIGURE 2 | Path model of socio-structural correlates of far right electoral support and political hate crimes in Germany. Standardized path coefficients for overall
analyses; West and East Germany separately in brackets (West/East); error terms are not displayed for the sake of clarity. ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.
FIGURE 3 | Path model of socio-structural and psychological correlates of right-wing electoral support and political hate crimes in Germany. Standardized path
coefficients for overall analyses; West and East Germany separately in brackets (West/East); error terms are not displayed for the sake of clarity. ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.10.
reported, β = −0.31, and even more strongly with far right
electoral support 1 year later, β = −0.42. Unemployment rate
on the other hand was linked with both AfD electoral success,
β = 0.26, and even more strongly with right-wing crimes reported,
β = 0.34 1 year later (all ps < 0.001). Taken together, both socio-
structural predictors explained 20% and 24% of variance in right-
wing crimes reported and AfD electoral support, respectively. To
correct for skew in the data, we also performed bootstrapping
analyses using 5000 bootstrap resamples and bias-corrected 95%
confidence intervals (CIs). As none of the resulting CIs included
zero, these analyses further supported the model.
We then introduced the three psychological variables,
collective deprivation, contact, and extreme right-wing attitudes,
into the model (Figure 3). A first saturated model included paths
between all constructs and, expectedly, fitted the data perfectly.
We then computed a second model where a total of eight paths
that we had not predicted were set to zero. Specifically, these
were paths from socio-structural variables to psychologically
incongruent constructs (i.e., paths from proportion of foreigners
to collective deprivation and from unemployment rate to contact)
and paths that we predicted to be zero because we assumed
the psychological contribution to be mediated through extreme
right-wing attitudes (i.e., paths from socio-structural variables
to extreme right-wing attitudes and paths from contact and
collective deprivation to both outcome variables, respectively).
As this second model was nested within the previous one, we
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compared both and concluded that the second explained the
data equally well, 1χ2 (df = 8) = 12.21, p = 0.14. It seems
noteworthy that, as predicted, the deleted paths were generally
statistically non-significant (ps > 0.10) except for the path from
unemployment rate to contact (β = 0.12, p = 0.02). The resulting
model is displayed in Figure 2. It had a good fit with the data, χ2
(N = 400, df = 8) = 15.57, p = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05,
PCLOSE = 0.47 (MacCallum et al., 1996; Hu and Bentler, 1999).
The original pattern remained almost unchanged when
psychological variables were included into the full model.
Extreme right-wing attitudes which had been significantly
correlated with both outcome variables only retained a weak but
reliable link with far right electoral support, β = 0.13, p = 0.01,
but were not significantly linked with right-wing crime reported,
β = 0.07, p = 0.16. Explained variance in both dependent variables
remained unchanged.6
Accounting for Shared Variance Due to Geographical
Proximity
As briefly mentioned above, the analyses reported thus far
neglect spatial auto-correlation or shared variance due to mere
geographical proximity. Such shared variance may be due to
common exposure of the observed variables to unobserved
confounders and can create problems for conventional statistical
models that assume random error (see Fotheringham et al., 2002;
Teney, 2012). We performed a series of GWR analyses using
spatial error models based on maximum likelihood estimation
and queen contiguity weights in GeoDA (Version 1.12; Anselin
et al., 2006; GeoDa, 2019) to address the issue of spatial auto-
correlation. As can be seen from Table 3, results from these
analyses replicated the results reported above in showing that
unemployment was linked positively with both far right electoral
support and right-wing crime while proportion of foreigners
was linked negatively with both outcomes. Regarding the survey
measures, the GWR analyses confirmed that they had weak
but significant links with far right electoral success above and
beyond socio-structural variables – the respective model was
superior to that without survey measures according to the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).7 Survey measures did not
contribute significantly to the explained variance in right-wing
crime as the outcome variable, however. In fact, that model
became significantly worse according to the associated AIC. It
seems noteworthy that the Lambda-coefficients were significant
across all analyses: there was strong support for spatially
correlated errors. Accordingly, the GWR models explained
substantially more variance in both far right electoral support
6An argument could be made that collective deprivation is not causally prior to
extreme right-wing attitudes but that it is in fact part of or even an outcome of
extreme right-wing attitudes. We therefore tested alternative models including (a)
a reverse path from extreme right-wing attitudes to collective deprivation and
(b) a bi-directional path between both constructs. Both models fitted the data
descriptively better than the original model that we had hypothesized. It therefore
seems worthwhile to note again that we are not testing any causal mechanisms
based on the correlational data reported.
7As a rule of thumb, an AIC difference of<2 indicates no meaningful discrepancy
between models; a difference between 4 and 7 indicates considerable evidence that
the model with the lower AIC is better, and a difference of>10 indicates substantial
support for the model with the lower AIC (Burnham and Anderson, 2002).
(R2 = 0.83) and right-wing crime (R2 = 0.38) than conventional
regression models.
Exploring East-West Differences
As we had observed considerable differences for all variables
of interest, we controlled for and explored the differences
between East and West Germany in a third and final set of
analyses. While accounting for spatial auto-correlation in GWR
analyses and East-West differences through dummy-coding,
we also included interaction terms with both socio-structural
variables. When predicting far right electoral support, we found
a significant interaction of proportion of foreigners and the
East-West dummy variable, z = 7.56, p < 0.001. Similarly,
when predicting right wing-crime, we found interactions
with the East-West dummy variable for both unemployment
rate, z = 4.37, p < 0.001, and proportion of foreigners,
z = 4.20, p< 0.001.
Following up on these results, we analyzed the data for
municipalities in East and West Germany separately. For far
right electoral support, both socio-structural factors retained
significant links with the outcome: unemployment rate retained
links of similar magnitude in the West, b = 0.36, z = 5.01,
compared with the East, b = 0.44, z = 2.65, ps < 0.01. Proportion
of foreigners, however, was linked much more strongly with the
outcome in the East, b = −1.19, z = 7.92, p < 0.001 than in the
West, b = −0.10, z = 2.76, p = 0.01.
For right-wing crime, when analyzing East and West German
municipalities separately, proportion of foreigners was no longer
significantly linked with the outcome in West Germany, z < 1,
and unemployment rate still retained a positive but much weaker
link, b = 1.02, z = 1.70, p = 0.09. In East Germany, however,
both socio-structural factors were still linked with the outcome:
unemployment rate, b = 8.20, z = 2.64, as well as proportion of
foreigners, b = 8.48, z = 2.77, ps < 0.01, were correlated with
right-wing crime significantly and positively.
Bootstrap analyses with 5000 resamples and bias-corrected
95% CIs generally replicated these results with some exceptions:
CIs for the paths from socio-structural factors to far right
electoral support did not include zero with the exception of the
path from unemployment rate to far right electoral support. For
right-wing crime, only those paths in East Germany were reliable
according to these analyses and did not include zero while both
paths in West Germany did. In a sense then this pattern of results
was similar but more pronounced than that of the GWR analyses.
DISCUSSION
The present study systematically combined data on socio-
structural variables (unemployment rates and proportion of
foreigners by municipality) with self-reported attitudes and
official data on actual behavior (police records on right-wing
hate crime and far right electoral support in the German federal
elections). In doing so, we tried to approximate what could be
referred to as a “climate of hate” – a bundle of objective as
well as more subjective or psychological variables all of which
contribute to a social norm or a perception of such a norm that
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TABLE 3 | Geographically weighted regression (GWR) results for socio-structural correlates of far right electoral support (top panel) and political hate crimes in
Germany (bottom panel).
Coeff. S.E. z Coeff. S.E. z
AfD electoral support
Constant 0.12 0.01 12.50∗∗ 0.14 0.01 12.60∗∗
Lambda 0.86 0.03 33.05∗∗ 0.85 0.03 29.88∗∗
Unemployment rate 0.47 0.08 5.76∗∗ 0.40 0.09 4.56∗∗
Proportion of foreigners −0.23 0.04 5.50∗∗ −0.22 0.04 5.02∗∗
Collective deprivation −0.01 0.001 3.31∗∗
Contact <0.001 0.002 <1
Extreme right-wing attitudes 0.003 0.002 2.04∗
R2 0.83 0.83
AIC −1818.54 −1559.36
Right-wing Crime
Constant 0.11 0.06 1.63 0.05 0.12 <1
Lambda 0.59 0.05 11.68∗∗ 0.58 0.05 10.96∗∗
Unemployment rate 5.72 0.86 6.62∗∗ 5.90 0.94 6.28∗∗
Proportion of foreigners −1.11 0.44 2.53∗ −1.39 0.48 2.93∗∗
Collective deprivation 0.02 0.03 <1
Contact 0.03 0.03 1.01
Extreme right-wing attitudes −0.01 0.03 <1
R2 0.38 0.39
AIC 189.09 172.94
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
facilitates hostile behaviors toward outgroups. One central notion
of the current work is, consequently, that more conventional but
potentially exclusionary behaviors such as far right voting on
the one hand and more extreme behaviors such as right-wing
hate crimes targeting refugees on the other hand should co-occur
because they are facilitated by similar factors.
Correlates of Behavioral Outcomes and
Local Variation
While unrelated with each other, both socio-structural factors
were linked with both outcome variables in a systematic fashion:
First, overall, the local proportion of foreigners was negatively
correlated with relative number of hate crimes, and more strongly
so with far right electoral support in municipalities. Second,
unemployment rate was positively linked with far right electoral
support, and more strongly so with relative number of hate
crimes reported. When examining these links for East and West
German municipalities separately, the pattern remained similar
for correlates of far right electoral support. However, the pattern
changed drastically for right-wing crime: While unemployment
rate was still positively linked with right-wing crime across
Germany (but substantially weaker so in Western municipalities),
proportion of foreigners was no longer linked with the same
outcome in West German municipalities. Contrary to what
we had expected, in East German municipalities, this relation
even reversed and proportion of foreigners was significantly and
positively linked with right-wing crime reported. This pattern
of results can be interpreted as an artificial overall negative
correlation between proportion of foreigners and reported right-
wing crime that can be attributed to the mean differences in
measures between East and West Germany. With regard to the
two behavioral outcomes, this local variation in their correlates
may provide preliminary evidence for related but contrary
underlying motives: While one seems to be driven by contact-
logic (more contact opportunities, less far right electoral support;
e.g., Allport, 1954), the other seems to be more in line with
group threat-logic (more foreigners, more right-wing crime; e.g.,
Teney, 2012). Methodologically, however, this result emphasizes
the importance of considering local variation of the phenomena
that are being investigated.
Attitudinal variables measured in a representative survey
were also linked with socio-structural variables in the predicted
direction, that is, intergroup contact correlated positively with
local proportion of foreigners, thus replicating a host of previous
research (Wagner et al., 2003, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2004).
Furthermore, collective deprivation correlated positively with
unemployment rates, and both, intergroup contact and collective
deprivation predicted extreme right-wing attitudes. However,
these predictors’ contribution to the explained variance in
outcome variables above and beyond socio-structural variables
was neglectable. We will address the limitations of the present
research in more detail further below after discussing potential
implications that can be drawn.
Identifying Areas at Risk for Right-Wing
Extremism Through Contextual
Indicators
In order to reduce or prevent political extremism, a first
step can be to identify and monitor areas that are at
particularly high risk of violent hate crimes. So far, monitoring
instruments for such hate crimes have been scarce or non-existent
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(Bencˇek and Strasheim, 2016; but see ProAsyl, 2017). We argue
that high risk areas can still be identified based on contextual
factors that are reliable correlates of actual violent extremism and
that such correlates can be found in the neighboring research
field on far right electoral support. For example, some previous
research has predicted incidents of violent right-wing attacks
from analyses of public discourse (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004)
or from social media data (Müller and Schwarz, 2018). Scholars
in the social sciences also seem to agree that there is merit in
collecting data on political attitudes including attitudes toward
outgroups in order to identify risks or at least shed light on
psychological processes that may turn prejudice into violence
(e.g., Wagner et al., 2003). All in all, the notion that contextual
factors can be useful in identifying high risk areas is not new and
two factors – unemployment rate and proportion of foreigners
in a given local context – have been particularly well studied
(Semyonov et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2008). In his review
of research on far right electoral success, Golder (2016) has
systematized these contextual factors into “economic grievances”
and “cultural grievances”. In discussing the global rise of the
far right, some have argued that it is more about culture than
economics (e.g., Norris and Inglehart, 2019), others that it is more
about economics than culture (Judis, 2018). And even others
have argued that such a binary distinction between economic and
cultural grievances is “far too simplistic and glosses over the way
in which concerns about culture and economics can, and often
do, interact” (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018, p. xxiv). We argue that
much can be learned from investigating far right electoral support
when studying right-wing hate crime and that both fields can
benefit from each other. Based on the current study, we conclude
that violent right-wing hate crime is particularly likely in areas
with high unemployment rates (as is far right electoral support)
and a high proportion of foreigners (contrary to far right electoral
support) but that this latter correlate may vary locally.
This finding is somewhat contradictory to intergroup contact
theory (Pettigrew, 1998; Wagner et al., 2006) but well in line with
the group threat hypothesis and the intuition that, in order for
hate crimes to occur, the target outgroup needs to be present.
Diversity, while increasing community resilience against far right
agitation through contact opportunities (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew
and Tropp, 2006) may ironically increase the risk of right-wing
crime in the same area.
Finally, far right electoral support was so strongly correlated
with relative number of right-wing hate crimes that it might be
considered an additional indicator for areas that are at high risk
for right-wing extremism. In other words, our results seem to be
supportive of the notion that far right electoral support is not only
an indicator, but actually part of the social climate of hate that
facilitates right-wing violence.
Limitations and Future Research
There are limitations of the current study, some of them due
to its overall cross-sectional design or the nature of the data
we use. First, we report correlational data that do not allow for
causal inferences. While the basic premise of the current work
does not necessarily hinge on causal relationships between the
constructs but is merely to show that two behavioral outcomes
are linked with the same socio-structural correlates and co-occur
systematically in certain areas, the variables we used as predictors
were all measured 1 year prior to the variables we used as criteria.
We would therefore argue that the analyses reported are at least to
some extent suggestive of the predictive value of socio-structural
and survey data for future outcomes. The distinction between
causality and correlation, however, is crucial especially for policy
makers and practitioners and future research using longitudinal
designs might tackle the issue of causality more convincingly.
Second, from a methodological point of view, the
compatibility of our measures especially at the interface of
socio-structural and survey data may be open to criticism.
More specifically, one could argue that perceived competition
on the labor market would be more compatible with local
unemployment than perceived collective deprivation. Also, the
use of single item-measures is problematic. The weak explanatory
performance of attitudinal variables, in other words, may then be
due to issues of validity and reliability. However, empirically, we
think the measures we used tap into the respective constructs –
they do in fact correlate with socio-structural variables in the
expected fashion (i.e., proportion of foreigners correlates with
contact and unemployment correlates with perceptions of
deprivation). While more elaborate data on the psychological
level including longer scales would certainly be desirable,
such data were not available for the analyses presented in
this contribution. Our analysis may thus serve as a proof of
principle and hopefully inspire future research to link socio-
structural data with survey data and attitudinal as well as actual
behavioral outcomes. Such research could also take context into
account more systematically by studying specific other European
countries experiencing an increase in far right electoral support,
such as, Hungary (Palonen, 2009), Italy (Verbeek and Zaslove,
2016), or The Netherlands (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013) or by
comparing far right electoral support and the prevalence of
hate-crime in countries across Europe (e.g., Lubbers et al., 2002).
Furthermore, future research might benefit from qualitative
or mixed-methods approaches, ideally in a longitudinal design
to examine regional specifics and developments in those
municipalities and areas most affected by a climate of hate. It
seems fruitful to investigate those contextual factors qualitatively,
social constellations, and regional specifics that facilitate a
climate of hate in identified risk areas to draw conclusions on
how to strengthen community resilience against extreme right-
wing behavior. Methodically, some studies already follow this
approach, taking closer looks at intergroup relations on a small-
scale level (Bynner, 2017) or at the “normalization” of anti-
refugee sentiments in everyday life of a medium sized town
(Kurtenbach, 2018).
Conclusion
The results of the current study can be placed within the wider
research fields on far right electoral support (e.g., Golder, 2016;
Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018) and the prevalence of hate-crime
in countries across the world. Understanding both phenomena
as partly connected may have important implications for future
research, both basic and applied, as well as for politics and
practice. Practitioners and policy-makers may find them useful
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in developing effective strategies to prevent or at least reduce
right-wing extremism by identifying high risk areas. Diverse
communities should be more resilient against far right agitation
whereas areas with little heterogeneity and high unemployment
rates are susceptible for a general climate of hate. A decentralized
housing policy for newcomers like refugees may thus decrease far
right support but also increase the risk for right-wing crime.
Our final conclusion relates to the added value of survey data
in identifying high risk areas. We believe that attitudinal data
and surveys will continue to contribute invaluable insights into
the processes of prejudice, discrimination, and radicalization.
However, our analysis and its results might also serve as a
cautionary note: Measures collected in a representative survey
were generally linked with socio-structural indicators in the
predicted pattern. Self-reported extreme right-wing attitudes
were even correlated with actual voting behavior in municipalities
1 year later. While this is good news for attitude research in
general and social scientists in particular, the bad news is that
the incremental predictive value of these survey data above and
beyond socio-structural indicators was neglectable.
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